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ABSTRACT: This paper considers how the terms ‘objection,’ ‘rebuttal,’ ‘attack,’ ‘refutation,’ ‘rebutting
defeater’ and ‘undercutting defeater’ (often referred to as rebutters versus undercutters) are used in writings
on argumentation and artificial intelligence. The central focus is on the term ‘rebuttal.’ A provisional
classification system is proposed that provides a normative structure within which the terms can be
clarified, distinguished from each other, and more precisely defined.
KEYWORDS: arguments, attack, defeasible reasoning, exception, generalizations, logical argumentation,
objection, rebuttal, refutation, undercutter

1. INTRODUCTION
For some time now I have been bothered about the way the terms ‘rebuttal’ and
‘refutation’ are commonly used in writings on argumentation, and also bothered by the
way the comparable terms ‘undercutter’ and ‘defeater’ are used in writings on artificial
intelligence (AI). It seems to me there is some confusion about these terms, and
considerable ambiguity and variety of loose usage. At the same time, such terms are
fundamental to argumentation theory and to attempts recently made in artificial
intelligence to build an argumentation technology. The very notion of a rational argument
itself would seem to be based on an underlying notion of conflict, or opposition between
one argument and another. But although this notion of opposition is fundamental, clearly
it is not possible to define it by using the traditional notion of classical negation. It may
be a primitive notion that can only been defined by relating it to a group of other
fundamental notions in argumentation theory.
There is a whole family of terms in argumentation that are closely related to each
other and that are fundamental concepts in the field, but are also often used in vague and
even confusing ways. All these terms refer to ways in which a given argument is
attacked, rebutted or objected to by the offering of a reason that casts this argument into
doubt, or even by the offering another reason to think that the argument is incorrect and
must be given up. A list of such key terms comprises the following ones: attack, rebuttal,
objection, undercutter, defeater and refutation. The term ‘rebuttal’ is often associated
with the work of Toulmin (1958), while the terms ‘undercutter’ and ‘defeater’ are often
associated with the work of Pollock (1995), and are commonly used in the AI literature.
Walton, D. (2009). Objections, Rebuttals and Refutations. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument Cultures:
Proceedings of OSSA 09, CD-ROM (pp. 1-10), Windsor, ON: OSSA.
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In this paper, I propose provisional definitions of the terms ‘objection,’ ‘rebuttal,’ ‘attack’
and ‘refutation,’ with a central focus on the term ‘rebuttal.’ These definitions are meant to
be useful for argumentation studies, and are meant to be open to critical questioning. My
arguments for them are even meant to be open to attack and rebuttal.
2. OBJECTION, REBUTTAL AND REFUTATION
We begin by noting that the term ‘objection’ is quite a broad one. An objection does not
necessarily have to be a counter-argument posed against an original argument. It could be
merely asking of a critical question. Even when an objection is a counter-argument posed
against an original argument, it does not have to be an argument that the original
argument is weak, unsupported or incorrect. It could be a procedural objection, not
implying that the argument it is addressed against is incorrect, insufficiently supported by
evidence, or even questionable as an argument in itself. Such a procedural objection
could merely claim that the argument, even though it might be reasonable enough, or well
enough supported in itself, is not appropriate for use in the context of the given
discussion. In law for example, an argument might be objected to on the grounds that the
evidence it purports to bring forward has been obtained illegally, even though that
evidence might otherwise be quite convincing in itself as a rational argument.
There may be a narrower sense of the word ‘objection’ however, that is used in
logic. Govier (1999, p. 229) considers an objection to be an argument raised against a
prior argument. Hence a question is not an objection: “On this view, a question purely
considered as such does not itself constitute an objection.” On her account, an objection
can be directed in one of two ways. The objection can claim that there is something
wrong with the conclusion, or it can claim that there is something wrong with the
argument. But these are not the only possibilities. She classifies five types of objections
(p. 231), depending on what the objection is specifically raised against: (1) against the
conclusion, (2) against the argument in support of the conclusion, (3) against the arguer,
(4) against the arguer’s qualifications, personal characteristics or circumstances, or (5)
against the way the argument or conclusion was expressed. It is interesting to note that
some of these categories of objection may correspond to or overlap with types of
arguments associated with some of the traditional informal fallacies. The third category
and two parts of the fourth the fourth may correspond to the ad hominem type of
argument while the first part of the fourth may correspond to a common type of attack on
arguments from expert opinion.
A somewhat different way of classifying objections to an argument has been put
forward by Krabbe (2007, pp. 55-57) who lists seven ways an opponent can critically
react to a proponent’s expressed argument. (1) A request for clarification, explanation or
elucidation may contain an implicit criticism that the argument was not clearly expressed
to start with. (2) A challenge to an argument comprises an expression of critical doubt
about whether a reason supports the argument. (3) A bound challenge raises a more
specific doubtful point that offers some reason for entertaining doubt. (4) An exposure of
a flaw poses a negative evaluation of an argument and requests further amplification. (5)
Rejection is a kind of critical reaction by an opponent who may not deny that the
proponent’s argument is reasonable, but takes up an opposite point of view. (6) A charge
of fallacy criticizes the contribution of the proponent by claiming he or she has violated
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some rule of fair procedure. (7) A personal attack is a common kind of critical reaction
that provides a means of defence against unreasonable moves by one’s opponent. Krabbe
(2007, p. 57) suggests that these critical reactions can properly be called objections,
because they expresses dissatisfaction with an argument presented by a proponent.
However, Krabbe (2007, p. 57) writes that to speak of a request for clarification or a pure
challenge as an objection would be an overstatement, because objections presuppose a
negative evaluation, whereas these other two types of reaction precede evaluation.
There are differences between these two views on what an objection is. Govier
(1999, p. 229), requires that an objection be an argument when she wrote,
An objection is an argument, a consideration put forward, alleged to show either that there is
something wrong with the conclusion in question or that there is something wrong with the
argument put forward in its favor.

Krabbe does hold the view that an objection has to be an argument. Ralph Johnson, in an
unpublished manuscript shown to the author, has advocated the view that an objection is
a response to an argument that can be in the form of a question or a statement, and does
not have to be an argument. I will take it that objection is a wider category than rebuttal,
so that while putting forward a rebuttal is making an objection in some instances, there
are also many instances in which an objection to an argument should not be classified as
a rebuttal.
Following this line, it seems like it should be simple to define the notion of a
rebuttal. A rebuttal requires two things. First, it requires a prior argument that it is
directed against. Second, the rebuttal itself is an argument that is directed against this
prior argument. Third, it is directed against the prior argument in order to show that it is
open to doubt or not acceptable.
What about the case where only a statement is directed against an argument? That
seems to be a rebuttal, if the statement was directed against the argument and implies that
the argument, or some part of it, is untenable, dubious or false. A statement is not an
argument. Should that be considered a rebuttal according to the definition above? Yes, it
should be, because when a statement is put forward in such a way, directed against an
argument, there is an implied inference from the statement, taken as a premise, to the
conclusion that the argument, or some part of it, is untenable, dubious or false. For
example, if the statement offered is the negation of the conclusion or one of the premises
of the original argument, it is implied that this conclusion is false or untenable. For the
present then, let’s accept it as working hypothesis that a rebuttal has to be an argument,
and cannot be just a statement, even though we may find an exception in section 4 below.
So it seems now that we can define a rebuttal as one of a pair of arguments, where
the two arguments are ordered, logically rather than temporally, so that the one precedes
the other, and so that the second one is directed against the first one. What does “directed
against” mean? It seems that one argument can have another argument as its target. The
one can be meant to support the other, or can be meant to attack the other, or the two
arguments can be independent of each other. Only in the middle instance would it be
correct to say that the one argument is directed against the other. But something more is
meant here. What seems to be implied is that a rebuttal is an argument directed against
another argument to show that the first argument is somehow defective. To rebut an
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argument is to try to show that the argument is questionable, or that it is not supported by
the evidence, or even that the evidence shows that it is untenable.
Is a refutation the same as a rebuttal? One way to define the relationship between
these two terms would be to say that a refutation is a successful rebuttal. On this way of
defining the two terms, a rebuttal is aimed to show that the argument it is directed against
is questionable or untenable. A refutation is a rebuttal that is successful in carrying out its
aim. So define the one term would seem to be a subspecies of the other. A refutation is a
species of rebuttal that shows that the argument it is aimed at is untenable. When an
argument you have put forward is confronted with a refutation, it has to be given up. If
the argument is confronted with a rebuttal, you may or may not have to give it up. Only if
the rebuttal is a refutation do you have to give it up.
The notion of an attack is another concept that needs to be fitted into this system
of classification. Is an attack the same thing as a rebuttal? At first, it seems that it is,
because an attack on an argument is designed to show that the argument is questionable,
that it is not supported by the evidence, or even that the evidence shows that it is
untenable. On the other hand, it would seem that it is not, because asking a critical
question could perhaps be classified as an attack on an argument, but it would not seem
quite right to see that asking such a critical question as a rebuttal. This classification may
be borderline, however. Asking a critical question casts doubt on an argument, but is
casting doubt on an argument rebutting it? It does not really seem quite right to use the
word ‘rebutting.’ This word seems to imply that the rebutting is being done by posing
another argument, and not merely by asking a question about the original argument, even
if it is a critical question that casts doubt on the argument.
3. ATTACK
The word ‘attack’ is also quite a broad notion as used in argumentation. An attack, it
would seem, does not necessarily have to be an argument, nor does it have to be posed
against a prior argument. One might, for example, attack a question or attack an assertion
as unsubstantiated, vague, ambiguous etc. However, the term attack is often used in AI in
such a way that it represents one argument, or a connected sequence of such arguments,
posed against another argument, or connected sequence of such arguments. In an attack
of this sort, the two sequences of arguments are seen as competing with each other, so
that if one is stronger than the other, it will win over against the other. There is even a
formal framework well known in AI (Dung 1995) in which the notion of an attack is
taken as a primitive
One finds it to be a widely held commonplace, with many variations in logic
textbooks and writings on logic that there are only three ways to attack an argument. One
is to argue that a premise is false or insufficiently supported. Another is to argue that the
conclusion doesn’t follow from the set of premises that were presented as supporting it.
The third is to argue that the conclusion can be shown to be false by the bringing forward
of a counter-argument opposed to the original argument. To attack an argument in the
third way, it may be enough to simply question whether its conclusion is true, but if a
given argument that is being attacked has a certain degree of strength, merely questioning
its conclusion may not be sufficient. What the attacker needs to do in such a case is to put
forward a second argument that is stronger than the original argument and that provides
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evidence for rejecting the conclusion of the original argument. Such an attack is sufficient
to defeat the original argument, unless its proponent can give further reasons to support it.
To these three ways we could add a fourth way. The fourth way is to argue that the given
argument is not relevant to the ultimate conclusion to be proved in the case at issue.
To attack an argument in the fourth way, matters of how the argument was used
for some purpose in a context of dialog needs to be taken into account. Even though the
given argument may stand, having repelled all attacks of the first three kinds, its force as
argument may be nullified if it is irrelevant. But is this kind of charge a rebuttal? Perhaps
it is not, if it is not an attack on the argument itself, but rather a charge that the argument
is not useful for some purpose. A charge of irrelevance is best seen as a procedural
objection to the effect that the argument is not useful to resolve the ultimate issue under
discussion. What is presupposed by a claim of relevance is that the given argument is
supposed to be used to resolve some unsettled issue in a discussion that is being carried
on in the given case. If an argument has no probative value as evidence to prove or
disprove the thesis at issue in a particular discussion, it may be dismissed as irrelevant.
However, although this attack may knock the argument out of consideration, it is not,
strictly speaking a rebuttal. Nor is it an attack on the argument, if an attack is taken to be
the same as a rebuttal. 1 It is a procedural objection.
Another qualification needs to be added. Although there may be three basic ways
to attack an argument, asking a critical question should not, in general be seen as an
attack on an argument. We should recall Govier’s remark that a question “purely
considered as such” does not itself constitute an objection. However, it has been shown
that critical questions differ in their force. In some instances, merely asking a critical
question makes the original argument default, while in other instances, asking the critical
question does not make the argument default unless the question asker can offer evidence
to back up the question (Walton and Godden 2005).
We to be careful to recall that there can be other ways of making an objection to
an argument that do not fall into the category of rebuttal. Thus the task of defining the
notion of an objection precisely, and the task of classifying the various types of
objections that can be made to an argument, remain open questions for future work. Still,
in this section we have made some progress towards this investigation by carefully
describing four basic ways to attack an argument, and by adding that asking a critical
question may also often be seen as a way of attacking an argument by raising critical
doubts about it. Argument attacks surely represent some of the central ways of raising an
objection about an argument. However, as Krabbe’s list of candidates for objections
suggests, there appear to be many other ways of making an objection to an argument that
need to be analyzed, discussed and studied.
There is also another way to attack an argument that has not yet been considered.
This way of attack does not apply to deductive arguments. It only applies to defeasible
inferences. Only the inductive and the plausibilistic types of inference are nonmonotonic,
and are susceptible to this type of attack. 2 This method is highly familiar in the recent
research on nonmonotonic logics for defeasible reasoning. It is to argue that there is an
1

This point may be used to show that attack is wider than rebuttal. An objection that an argument is
irrelevant may not strictly speaking, be a rebuttal, but it does, broadly speaking seem like an attack.
2
Deductive reasoning is monotonic, meaning that a deductive argument always remains valid even if new
premises are added.

5

DOUGLAS WALTON
exception to the rule, and that the given case falls under the category of this type of
exception. This third way of attacking an argument is very familiar in recent studies of
defeasible reasoning, like the classical Tweety inference: birds fly; Tweety is a bird;
therefore Tweety flies. This inference is based on the defeasible generalization that birds
normally fly, or it could also be analyzed as being based a conditional rule to the effect
that if something is a bird it flies. Since such a conditional is open to exceptions, meaning
that it will default in some cases. It can be questioned whether this kind of attack is really
an attack on the argument. It can be argued that it is better classified as an attack on the
assumption that the argument, or the rule of inference it is based on, is applicable to the
fact of the particular case at issue. We return to this question in section 4.
For the present, let us say that ‘attack’ and ‘rebuttal’ may be treated as equivalent
terms. Both refer to the situation of one argument (the attacking argument) directed
against another (the target argument) to show that the target argument is somehow
defective (questionable, not supported by the evidence, untenable, etc.).
4. REBUTTAL
Perhaps the best known use of the term ‘rebuttal’ in argumentation theory is Toulmin’s
use of it in his argument model, containing the elements datum, qualifier, claim, warrant,
backing and rebuttal. In the model (Toulmin 1958, p. 101), the datum is supported by a
warrant that leads to a claim that is qualified by conditions of exception or rebuttal. For
example (p. 99), the claim that a man is a British subject might be supported by the datum
that he was born in Bermuda, based on the warrant that a man born in Bermuda will be a
British subject. The warrant appears to be similar to what is often called a generalization
in logic. This example of an argument is defeasible, because the generalization is subject
to exceptions, and hence the argument is subject to defeat if the information comes in
showing that the particular case at issue is one where an exception holds. For example,
although a man may have been born in Bermuda, he may have changed his nationality
since birth (p. 101). Toulmin uses the word ‘rebuttal,’ but other words like ‘refutation’ or
‘defeater’ might also be used to apply to such a case.
The meaning term of the term ‘warrant’ in Toulmin’s argument layout has long
been the subject of much controversy (Hitchcock and Verheij 2006). A Toulmin warrant
is in typical instances general statement that acts as an inference license, in contrast to the
datum and claim that tend to be specific statements. In logical terms, it could be described
as a propositional function or open sentence of this form: if a person x was born in
Bermuda, then generally that person x is a British subject.
Toulmin’s notion of a rebuttal seems simple at first. A rebuttal, on his Bermuda
example, is simply an exception to a rule (warrant, in Toulmin’s terms). However,
according to Verheij (2008, p. 20), rebuttal is an ambiguous concept in Toulmin’s
treatment, and five meanings of the term need to be distinguished. First, rebuttals are
associated with “circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have
to be set aside” (Toulmin 1958, p. 101). Second, rebuttals are “exceptional circumstances
which might be capable of defeating or rebutting the warranted conclusion” (Toulmin
1958, p. 101). Third, rebuttals are associated with the non-applicability of a warrant
(Toulmin 1958, p. 102). But a warrant could also be an argument against the datum, a
different sort of rebuttal from an argument against the warrant or the claim. In traditional

6

OBJECTIONS, REBUTTALS AND REFUTATIONS
logical terms, this would be an argument claiming that a premise of the inference being
rebutted does not hold. Verheij also distinguishes between the warrant that acts as an
evidential support of the conditional and the conditional that is one premise in the
inference. On his analysis a rebuttal can attack the conditional or it can attacks the
warrant that supports the conditional as evidence
Judging by Toulmin’s Bermuda example, the notion of rebuttal seems fairly
simple. A rebuttal is an opposed argument that cites an instance in which the warrant in
the original argument no longer applies. It cites an exception to the rule. But on Verheij’s
explication, Toulmin’s account of rebuttal is more complex than it looks. Describing
rebuttal as citing an exception to a rule of inference on which an argument was based
sound similar to what is called undercutting in the literature on defeasibility (Pollock
1995).
5. REBUTTERS AND UNDERCUTTERS
Pollock’s distinction between two kinds of counter-arguments called rebutting defeaters
and undercutting defeaters (often referred to as rebutters versus undercutters) is drawn as
follows. A rebutting defeater gives a reason for denying a claim by arguing that the claim
is a false previously held belief (Pollock 1995, p. 40). An undercutting defeater attacks
the inferential link between the claim and the reason supporting it by weakening or
removing the reason that supported the claim. The way Pollock uses these terms, a
rebutter gives a reason to show the conclusion is false, whereas an undercutter merely
raises doubt whether the inference supporting the conclusion holds. It does not show that
the conclusion is false.
To explain this distinction it is best to use an example. The classic example is the
Tweety argument: Birds fly, Tweety is a bird; therefore Tweety flies.’ If new information
comes in telling us that Tweety is a penguin, the original Tweety argument is undercut.
Generally speaking, the argument still holds. Generally birds fly, and hence, given that
Tweety is a bird, it follows that Tweety flies. But in this particular case, we have found
out that Tweety is a penguin. Hence in this particular case, since we know that Tweety is
type of bird that does not fly, we can no longer use the former inference to draw the
conclusion that Tweety flies.
Pollock’s original red light example (1995, p. 41) is also worth considering.
For instance, suppose x looks red to me, but I know that x is illuminated by red lights and red
lights can make objects look red when they are not. Knowing this defeats the prima facie reason,
but it is not a reason for thinking that x is not red. After all, red objects look red in red light too.
This is an undercutting defeater (Pollock’s italics in both instances).

To show how the red light example has the defining characteristics of a species of
rebuttal, we analyze it as an initial (given) argument and a counter-argument posed
against it. Let’s call this pair the original argument and the attacking argument.
The Original Argument
When an object looks red, then (normally, but subject to exceptions) it is red.
This object looks red to me.
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Therefore this object is red.
The Attacking Argument
This object is illuminated by a red light.
When an object is illuminated by a red light, this can make it look red even
though it is not.
Therefore the original argument (the prima facie reason for concluding that this
object is red expressed by the original argument) no longer holds.
Pollock (p. 41) states that the attacking argument should be classified as an undercutter
rather than a rebutter because red objects look red in red light too. Even given the
attacking argument, the object may be red, for all we know. Using Pollock’s language, it
would not be right to say that the attacking argument is a rebutting defeater that shows
that the conclusion of the original argument is false. What it shows is that although the
original arguments still holds as a prima facie reason for concluding that this object is
red, because of the new information about the red light that has come in, the attacking
argument, built on this new information added in, casts doubt on the conclusion of the
original argument.
The red light example depends on a type of argumentation that has been called
argument from appearance (Walton 2006), while the Tweety example depends on a
generalization that is subject to exceptions. Let’s consider a third example, due to
Prakken (2003): if something looks like an affidavit, it is an affidavit; this object looks
like an affidavit; therefore it is an affidavit. This inference might fail if we are taking part
in a TV series about a trial in which props are used. A document on a desk might look
like an affidavit, but after all this is a TV series. It might not be an affidavit, but merely a
prop made to look like one. In the context, the original argument fails to support the
conclusion that the document in question is an affidavit. But maybe it is a real affidavit.
An easy way to get such a prop for the TV series would be to ask someone who has
access to real affidavits to get one for use it the TV series. Thus this example looks
similar to the red light example.
There is one final issue that cannot be resolved here but that needs to be stated. It
is often said that while the rebutter attacks the conclusion of the argument it was directed
against, the undercutter attacks the inferential link on which the argument was based.
What does this mean? Does it mean that the rebutter claims to show that the rule of
inference on which the argument was based was not rightly applied? Or does it mean that
the old rule of inference needs to be replaced with a more complex one, once the new
knowledge has come in? This issue remains a troublesome one for understanding how
rebutters work.
6. CONCLUSION
To sort out these terms in a way that could be useful as a way of offering an orderly and
consistent way for argumentation theory to proceed, the following provisional tree of
definitions can be proposed. Objection is the widest category of those we considered. It
includes procedural objections, and many kinds of attacks that should not, strictly
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speaking, be called rebuttals. An objection does not have to be an argument even though
it is comparable to an argument in that it assumes that there is something negative about
an original argument, or move in argumentation, that needs to be responded to, called into
question and corrected. A rebuttal is a species of objection.
A rebuttal is an argument directed against another argument to show that the
first argument is somehow defective. To rebut an argument is to try to show that the
argument is questionable, or that it is not supported by the evidence, or even that the
evidence shows that it is untenable. A rebuttal can attack a premise of the original
argument, it can attack the conclusion, or it can act as an undercutter that presumably
somehow attacks the inference from the premises to the conclusion. There are two kinds
of rebuttals, called rebutters and undercutters. A refutation is a species of rebuttal that
shows that the argument it is aimed at is untenable. It could be called a knock-down
counter-argument. When an argument you’ve put forward is confronted with a refutation,
it has to be given up. An attack, in the sense of the word as used in the field of
argumentation, is an argument directed against another argument to show that the first
argument is somehow defective. In other words, for purposes of argumentation study, the
words ‘rebuttal’ and ‘attack’ can be taken as equivalent.
These provisional definitions are all defeasible, and the reader is encouraged to
search for borderline cases and potential counter-examples. Some of the more fuzzy cases
that need further study include objections of irrelevance of the original argument and the
asking of critical questions in response to the original argument. It seems to be a good
general principle that asking a critical question in response to an argument should not be
classified as the making of an attack, rebuttal, or refutation on that argument. This
conclusion is controversial, however, for there is a literature on critical questioning that
seems to describe this activity, at least in some instances, using the nomenclature of
attack and rebuttal. Also, there needs to be more study of the verb ‘to criticize’ in relation
to the activity of critical questioning. So we invite the reader, in a friendly spirit, to try to
attack, rebut or refute the classifications and definitions proposed.
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